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Abstract
We present a novel non-interactive (t, n)-incidence
count estimation for indicator vectors ensuring Dif-
ferential Privacy [8, 1]. Given one or two differen-
tially private indicator vectors, estimating the dis-
tinct count of elements in each [3] and their intersec-
tion cardinality (equivalently, their inner product [1])
have been studied in the literature, along with other
extensions for estimating the cardinality set inter-
section in case the elements are hashed prior to in-
sertion [2]. The core contribution behind all these
studies was to address the problem of estimating the
Hamming weight (the number of bits set to one) of a
bit vector from its differentially private version, and
in the case of inner product and set intersection, esti-
mating the number of positions which are jointly set
to one in both bit vectors.
We develop the most general case of estimating the
number of positions which are set to one in exactly
t out of n bit vectors (this quantity is denoted the
(t, n)-incidence count), given access only to the dif-
ferentially private version of those bit vectors. This
means that if each bit vector belongs to a different
owner, each can locally sanitize their bit vector prior
to sharing it, hence the non-interactive nature of our
∗This work is supported by Cisco grant CG# 593780.
†mohammad.alaggan@inria.fr
‡mathieu.cunche@inria.fr
§marine.minier@loria.fr
algorithm.
Our main contribution is a novel algorithm that
simultaneously estimates the (t, n)-incidence counts
for all t ∈ {0, . . . , n}. We provide upper and lower
bounds to the estimation error.
Our lower bound is achieved by generalizing the
limit of two-party differential privacy [11] into n-
party differential privacy, which is a contribution of
independent interest. In particular we prove a lower
bound on the additive error that must be incurred by
any n-wise inner product of nmutually differentially-
private bit vectors.
Our results are very general and are not limited
to differentially private bit vectors. They should ap-
ply to a large class of sanitization mechanism of bit
vectors which depend on flipping the bits with a con-
stant probability.
Some potential applications for our technique in-
clude physical mobility analytics [14], call-detail-
record analysis [2], and similarity metrics compu-
tation [1].
1 Introduction
Consider a set of n bit vectors, each of size m. Let
a be the vector with m components, in which ai ∈
{0, . . . , n} is the sum of the bits in the i-th position
in each of the n bit vectors. Then the (t, n)-incidence
count is the number of positions i such that ai =
1
t. Let the incidence vector Φ be the vector of n + 1
components in which Φt is the (t, n)-incidence count,
for t ∈ {0, . . . , n}. It should be noted that
∑
t Φt = m,
since all m buckets must be accounted for. Φ can also
be viewed as the frequency of elements or histogram of
a.
Now consider the vector ã resulting from the sani-
tized version of those vectors, if they have been sani-
tized by probabilistically flipping each bit b indepen-
dently with probability 0 < p < 1/2:
b 7→ b⊕ Bernoulli(p) . (1)
Then each component of ã will be a random variable1
defined as: ãi = Binomial(ai, 1 − p) + Binomial(n −
ai, p). This is because (1) can be rewritten as: b 7→
Bernoulli(p) if b = 0 and b 7→ Bernoulli(1−p) if b = 1,
and there are ai bits whose value is one, and n− ai
bits whose value is zero, and the sum of identical
Bernoulli random variables is a Binomial random
variable.
Finally, define Ψ to be the histogram of ã, similarly
to Φ. To understand Ψ consider entry i of Φ, which
is the number Φi of buckets containing i ones out of
n. Take one such bucket; there is a probability that
the i ones in that bucket be turned into any of j =
0, 1, . . . , n. The vector describing such probabilistic
transformation follows a multinomial distribution.
This is visually illustrated in Figure 1, by virtue of an
example on two bit vectors.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel algo-
rithm to estimate the true incidence vector Φ given
the sanitized incidence vector Ψ and p.
This model captures perturbed Linear Counting
Sketches (similar to [9] which is not a flipping model),
and BLIP [1, 2] (a differentially-private Bloom filter).
In [1], Alaggan, Gambs, and Kermarrec showed
that when the flipping probability satisfies (1−p)/p =
exp(ε) for ε > 0, then this flipping mechanism will
satisfy ε-differential privacy (cf. Definition 2.1). This
means that the underlying bit vectors will be pro-
1Which is a special case of the Poisson binomial distribu-
tion, where there are only two distinct means for the underlying
Bernoulli distributions. The mean and variance of ãi are defined
as the sums of the means and variances of the two underlying
binomial distribution, because they are independent.
Figure 1: An example to our model. There are two
bit vectors and a represents the number of bits set
to one in each adjacent position, while Φ represents
the histogram of a. For example Φ1 is the number
of entries in a which are equal to 1 (shown in red).
The rest of the diagram shows what happens to en-
tries of a if the bit vectors are sanitized by randomly
and independently flipping each of their bits with
probably p < 1/2, and how the histogram conse-
quently changes to the random variable Ψ. In par-
ticular, that Φt is probabilistically transformed into a
vector-valued Multinomial random variable.
tected with non-interactive randomized-response ε-
differential privacy in which ε = ln((1− p)/p).
1.1 Summary of Our Results
We find that our results are best presented in terms
of another parameter 0 < η < 1 instead of p. Let η
be such that the flipping probably p = 1/2− η/2. We
will not reference p again in this paper.
In our presentation and through the entirety of this
paper, both η (which we will reference as “the priv-
cay parameter”) and ε (which will be referenced as
“the differential privacy parameter”) are completely
interchangeable; since one fully determines the other
through the relation
ε = ln(
1 + η
1− η
) . (2)
However, our theoretical results will be presented in
terms of η for the sake of simplicity of presentation.
On the other hand, the experimental evaluation will
be presented in terms of ε; since ε is the differential
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privacy parameter and it will provide more intuition
to the reader about the privacy guarantees provided
for the reported utility (additive error). In a practical
application, one may decide the value of ε first to
suit their privacy and utility needs and then compute
the resulting η value that is then given to our algo-
rithm. A discussion on how to choose ε is provided
in [1], which may also aid the reader with having an
intuition to the value of ε used in our experimental
evaluation and why we decided to use those values.
(t, n)-Incidence Estimation. In the following we
describe upper U and lower bounds L to the ad-
ditive error. That is, maxi |Ψi − Φ′i| 6 U and L 6
mini |Ψi − Φ′i|, in which Φ
′ is the estimate output by
our algorithm (for the upper bound) or the estimate
output by any algorithm (for the lower bound). L and
U may depend on m, the size of the bit vectors, n, the
number of bit vectors, η, the privacy parameter, and
β, the probability that the bounds fails for at least one
i.
Upper Bound. Theorem 4.4 states that there exist
an algorithm that is ε-differentially private that, with
probability at least 1− β, simultaneously estimates Φi
for all i with additive error no more than
√
2m ·O(η−n) ·
√
ln
(
1
β
)
·
√
ln(n+ 1) .
Note that this is not a trivial bound since it is a bound
on estimating n > 2 simultaneous n-wise inner prod-
ucts. Additionally, in relation to the literature on com-
munication complexity [11], we consider the number-
in-hand rather than number-on-forehead communica-
tion model, which is more strict.
The O(η−n) factor is formally proven, but in prac-
tice the actual value is much smaller, as explained
in Section 6.1. A discussion of the practicality of
this bound given the exponential dependence on n is
given in Section 4.2.
Lower Bound. In Theorem 5.10 we generalize the
results of [11] to multiple bit vectors and obtain the
lower bound that for all i, any ε-differentially private
algorithm for approximating Φi must incur additive
error
Ω
( √
m
log2(m)
· β ·
(
1− η
1 + η
))
,
with probability at least 1−β over randomness of the
bit vectors and the randomness of the perturbation.
It is worth noting that the upper bounds hold for all
values of ε, but the lower bound is only shown for
ε < 1. Also notice that this lower bound does not
depend on n.
The result also presents a lower bound on the ad-
ditive error that must be incurred by any such al-
gorithm for estimating n-wise inner product. The
relation between the n-wise inner product and (t, n)-
incidence is made explicit in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.10.
In Section 2, we start by presenting differential
privacy, after which we discuss the related work in
Section 3, then in Section 4 we describe the the (t, n)-
incidence counting algorithm and prove its upper
bounds. The lower bound on n-wise inner product
is then presented in Section 5. Finally, we finish by
validating our algorithm and bounds on a real dataset
in Section 6 before concluding in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Differential Privacy
The notion of privacy we are interested is Differen-
tial Privacy [8]. It is considered a strong definition
of privacy since it is a condition on the sanitization
mechanism that holds equally well for any instance of
the data to be protected. Furthermore, it makes no as-
sumptions about the adversary. That is, the adversary
may be computationally unbounded and has access
to arbitrary auxiliary information. To achieve this,
any differentially private mechanism must be ran-
domized. In fact, the definition itself is a statement
about a probabilistic event where the probability is
taken only over the coin tosses of such mechanism.
The intuition behind differential privacy is that the
distribution of the output of the mechanism should
not change much (as quantified by a parameter ε)
when an individual is added or removed from the
input. Therefore, the output does not reveal much
information about that individual nor even about the
very fact whether they were in the input or not.
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Definition 2.1 (ε-Differential Privacy [8]). A random-
ized function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is ε-differentially
private, if for all vectors x,y, t ∈ {0, 1}n:
Pr[F(x) = t] 6 exp(ε ·‖x−y‖H) Pr[F(y) = t] , (3)
in which ‖x−y‖H is the Hamming distance between
x and y, that is, the number of positions at which
they differ. The probability is taken over all the coin
tosses of F .
The parameter ε is typically small and is usually
thought of as being less than one. The smaller its
value the less information is revealed and more pri-
vate the mechanism is. However, it also means less es-
timation accuracy and higher estimation error. There-
fore the choice of a value to use for ε is a trade-off
between privacy and utility. To the best of our knowl-
edge there is no consensus on a method to decide
what this value should be. In some of the litera-
ture relevant to differentially private bit vectors [1],
an attack-based approach was adopted as a way to
choose the largest ε (and thus highest utility) possible
such that the attacks fail. Given the attacks from [1]
we can choose ε up to three without great risk.
3 Related Work
Incidence counting has been studied in the stream-
ing literature as well as in the privacy-preserving
algorithms literature under the names: t-incidence
counting [9], occurrence frequency estimation [6, 7],
or distinct counting [13]. We use these terms inter-
changeably to mean an accurate estimate of the dis-
tinct count, not an upper or lower bound on it.
There are several algorithms in the streaming liter-
ature that estimate the occurrence frequency of differ-
ent items or find the most frequent items [9, 7, 6]. The
problem of occurrence frequency estimation is related
to that of incidence counting in the following manner:
they are basically the same thing except the former
reports normalized relative values. Our algorithm, in-
stead, reports all the occurrence frequencies, not just
the most frequent ones. We face the additional chal-
lenging that we are given a privacy-preserving version
of the input instead of its raw value, but since in our
application (indicator vectors) usually m  n, we
use linear space in n, rather than logarithmic space
like most streaming algorithms.
The closest to our work is the t-incidence count
estimator of Dwork, Naor, Pitassi, Rothblum, and
Yekhanin [9]. Their differentially private algorithm
takes the private stream elements ai before sanitation
and sanitizes them. To the contrary, our algorithm
takes the elements ai after they have already been
sanitized. An example inspired by [2] is that of call
detail records stored by cell towers. Each cell tower
stores the set of caller/callee IDs making calls for
every time slot (an hour or a day for instance), as
an indicator vector. After the time slot ends, the
resulting indicator vector is submitted to a central
facility for further analysis that involves multiple cell
towers. Our work allows this central facility to be
untrusted, which is not supported by [9].
In subsequent work, Mir, Muthukrishnan, Nikolov,
and Wright [13] propose a p-stable distribution-based
sketching technique for differentially private distinct
count. Their approach also supports deletions (i.e. ai
may be negative), which we do not support. How-
ever, to reduce the noise, they employ the exponential
mechanism [12], which is known to be computation-
ally inefficient. Their algorithm also faces the same
limitations than the ones of [9].
4 Upper Bounds
The algorithm we present and the upper bounds
thereof depend on the probabilistic linear mapping
A′ between the observed random variable Ψ and the
unknown Φ which we want to estimate. In fact, A′
and its expected value A = E[A′] are the primary
objects of analysis of this section. Therefore we begin
by characterizing them.
Recall that Ψ is the histogram of ã (cf. Figure 1)
and that the distribution of ãi is Z(n, p, ai) in which
Z(n, p, j) = Binomial(j, 1− p) + Binomial(n− j, p) ,
(4)
and p < 1/2. The probability mass function of
Z(n, p, j) is presented in Appendix A.
In what follows we drop the n and p parameters
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of Z(n, p, j) since they are always implied from con-
text. We will also denote P (Z(j)) be the probability
vector characterizing Z(j): (Pr[Z(j) = 0],Pr[Z(j) =
1], . . . ,Pr[Z(j) = n]). Finally, ei will denote the ith
basis vector. That is, the vector whose components
are zero except the ith component which is set to one.
The following proposition defines the probabilistic
linear mapping A′ between Ψ and Φ.
Proposition 4.1. Let A′ be a matrix random vari-
able whose jth column independently follows the multi-
nomial distribution Multinomial(Φj ,P (Z(j))). Then
the histogram of ã is the sum of the columns of A′:
Ψ = A′1 in which 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1), and thus Ψ =∑
j Multinomial(Φj ,P (Z(j))).
Proof. Since Ψ is the histogram of ã, it is thus can
be written as Ψ =
∑
i eãi =
∑
j
∑
i∈{k|ak=j} eãi .
Then since 1) the sum of k independent and identical
copies of Multinomial(1,p), for any p, has distribu-
tion Multinomial(k,p), and 2) |{k | ak = j}| = Φj
by definition, and 3) eãi is a random variable whose
distribution is Multinomial(1,P (Z(ai))), then the re-
sult follows; because
∑
i∈{k|ak=j} eãi has distribution
Multinomial(Φj ,P (Z(j))).
The following corollary defines the matrix A,
which is the the expected value of A′.
Corollary 4.2. Let A ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) be the matrix
whose jth column is P (Z(j)). Then EΨ = AΦ.
Proof. Follows from the mean of the multino-
mial distribution: E[Multinomial(Φj ,P (Z(j)))] =
ΦjP (Z(j)).
It is also worth noting that due to the symmetry in
(4), we have that
Aij = Pr[Z(j) = i] = Pr[Zn−j = n− i] = An−i,n−j .
(5)
For the rest of the paper we will be working exclu-
sively with `1-normalized versions of Ψ and Φ. That
is, the normalized versions will sum to one. Since
they both originally sum to m, dividing both of them
by m will yield a vector that sums to one. The fol-
lowing corollary extends the results of this section
to the case when Ψ and Φ are normalized to sum
to one. In the following, diag(x) is the diagonal ma-
trix whose off-diagonal entries are zero and whose
diagonal equals x.
Corollary 4.3.
(
Ψ = A′1 = A′diag(1/Φ)Φ
)
=⇒(
Ψ/m = A′diag(1/Φ)(Φ/m)
)
, and consequently(
EΨ = AΦ
)
=⇒
(
EΨ/m = AΦ/m
)
.
4.1 The Estimation Algorithm
Let Φ̂ = Φ/m and Ψ̂ = Ψ/m be the `1-normalized
versions of Φ and Ψ.
Intuition. The first step in our algorithm is to estab-
lish a confidence interval2 of diameter f(δ)/2 around
the perturbed incidence vector Ψ̂, such that, with
probability at least 1− β, its expected value x def= AΦ̂ is
within this interval. Note that this confidence inter-
val depends only of public parameters such as η, m,
and n, but not on the specific Ψ̂ vector. Afterwards,
we use linear programming to find a valid incidence
vector within this interval that could be the preimage
of Ψ̂, yielding the vector y def= AΦ̂
′
. Since x is within
this interval with probability at least 1− β then the
linear program has a solution with probability at least
1− β. Consequently, x and y are within `∞ distance
f(δ) from each other, with probability at least 1−β. It
remains to establish, given this fact, the `∞ distance
between the true Φ̂ and the estimated Ψ̂
′
, which is
an upper bound to the additive error of the estimate.
The details are provided later in Section 4.2.
Our estimation algorithm will take Ψ̂ and A as
input and will produce an estimate Φ̂
′
to Φ̂. It will
basically use linear programming to guarantee that∥∥Ψ̂−AΦ̂′∥∥∞ 6 f(δ)/2 . (6)
The notation ‖x‖∞ is the max norm or `∞ norm and is
equal to maxi |xi|. Suitable constraints to guarantee
that Φ̂
′
is a valid frequency vector (that its compo-
nents are nonnegative and sum to 1) are employed.
These constraints cannot be enforced in case the naı̈ve
2The word “interval” is inappropriate here since the random
variable is a vector. Technically, “`∞-ball” would be more appro-
priate.
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unbiased estimator A−1Ψ̂ is used (it would be unbi-
ased because of Corollary 4.3). This linear program
is shown in Algorithm 1.
The objective function of the linear program.
The set of constraints of the linear program specify a
finite convex polytope with the guarantee that, with
probability 1− β, the polytope contain the true solu-
tion, and that all points in this polytope are within a
bounded distance from the true solution. We are then
simply using the linear program as a linear constraint
solver that computes an arbitrary point within this
polytope. In particular, we are not using the linear
program as an optimization mechanism. Hence, the
reader should not be confused by observing that the
objective function which the linear program would
normally minimize is simply a constant (zero) which
is independent of the LP solution.
From a practical point of view, however, it matters
which point inside the polytope gets chosen. In par-
ticular, the polytope represents the probabilistically-
bounded preimage of the perturbed observation. It
is unlikely that the true solution lies exactly on or
close to the boundary of such polytope, and is rather
expected, probabilistically speaking, to exist closer
to the centroid of the polytope that to its boundary.
We have experimentally validated that, for low n, the
centroid of the polytope is at least twice as close to the
true solution than the output of the linear program
(using the interior point method) which is reported in
Section 6. Unfortunately, it is computationally inten-
sive to compute the centroid for high n and thus we
were not able to experimentally validate this claim in
these cases. This also means that the centroid method
is not practical enough. Instead, we recomment the
use of the interior point algorithm for linear program-
ming which is more likely to report a point from the
interior of the polytope that the simplex algorithm
which always reports points exactly on the boundary.
We have also experimentally validated that the for-
mer always produces better estimates than the latter,
even though both of them do satisfy our upper bound
(which is independent of the LP algorithm used). An
alternative theoretical analysis which provides an for-
mal error bound for the centroid method could be
the topic of future work. In Section 6 we only report
results using the interior method algorithm.
Parameter Selection. The remainder of this section
and our main result will proceed to show sufficient
conditions that, with high probability, make (6) imply∥∥Φ̂′ − Φ̂∥∥∞ 6 δ for user-specified accuracy require-
ment δ. These conditions will dictate that either one
of δ, ε, or m depend on the other two. Typically the
user will choose the two that matter to him most and
let our upper bounds decide the third. For example,
if the user wants m to be small for efficiency and δ
also be small for accuracy, then she will have to settle
for a probably large value of ε which sacrifices pri-
vacy. Sometimes the resulting combination may be
unfeasible or uninteresting. For instance, maybe m
is required to be too large to fit in memory or sec-
ondary storage. Or perhaps δ will be required to be
greater than one, which means that the result will be
completely useless. In these cases the user will have
to either refine his choice of parameters or consider
whether his task is privately computable in the ran-
domized response model. It may also be the case that
a tighter analysis may solve this problem, since some
parts of our analysis are somewhat loose bounds and
there may be room for improvement. The probability
1−β that the bound holds can be part of the trade-off
as well.
Algorithm 1 Linear Program
Given Ψ̂ and η, solve the following linear pro-
gram for the variable Φ̂
′
, in which f(δ)/2 =
‖A−1‖∞
√
2 ln(1/β) ln(n+ 1)/m.
minimize 0 ,
s.t. ∀i −f(δ)/2 6
∑
j Ψ̂j −AijΦ̂′j 6 f(δ)/2 ,
and ∀i Φ̂′i > 0 ,
and
∑
i Φ̂
′
i = 1 .
Then output Φ′ = mΦ̂
′
as the estimate of Φ.
4.2 Upper Bounding the Additive Error
As explained earlier, the first step is to find an `∞
ball of confidence around the the expected value of
the perturbed incidence vector. This is is provided
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by Theorem B.1 through a series of approximations
and convergences between probability distributions,
which are detailed in two lemmas, all in the appendix.
The high level flow and the end result is shown in the
following theorem and is meant only to be indicative.
For details or exact definitions of particular symbols,
kindly refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.4. The component-wise additive error be-
tween the estimated incidence vector output by Algo-
rithm 1 and the true incidence vector is
∥∥Φ − Φ′∥∥∞ 6
√
2m ·O(η−n) ·
√
ln
(
1
β
)
·
√
ln(n+ 1).
Proof. Assuming the matrix A is nonsingular, the ma-
trix norm (of A−1) induced by the max norm is, by
definition:
∥∥A−1∥∥∞ = supx6=0 {∥∥A−1x∥∥∞ / ‖x‖∞},
and since A is nonsingular we can substitute
x = Ay in the quantifier:
∥∥A−1∥∥∞ =
supy 6=0
{∥∥A−1Ay∥∥∞ / ‖Ay‖∞} without loss of gen-
erality, yeilding supy 6=0 {‖y‖∞ / ‖Ay‖∞}. Thus for
all y 6= 0,
∥∥A−1∥∥∞ > ‖y‖∞‖Ay‖∞ . If we multiply both
sides by ‖Ay‖∞ /‖A−1‖∞ (which is positive), we get:∥∥A−1∥∥−1∞ ‖y‖∞ 6 ‖Ay‖∞. In the following, we let
y = Φ̂ − Φ̂
′
. The rest of the proof begins by upper
bounding the following expression using the preced-
ing derivation:∥∥A−1∥∥−1∞ ∥∥Φ̂− Φ̂′∥∥∞ 6 ∥∥A(Φ̂− Φ̂′)∥∥∞
=
∥∥AΦ̂−AΦ̂′∥∥∞ = ∥∥∥AΦ̂ + (Ψ̂− Ψ̂)−AΦ̂′∥∥∥∞
6
∥∥AΦ̂− Ψ̂∥∥∞ + ∥∥AΦ̂′ − Ψ̂∥∥∞
6 2
∥∥AΦ̂− Ψ̂∥∥∞ (LP constraint)
6
2
m
CDF−1G(aR+M,bR)(1− β) (By Lemma B.3;Φj ↑, n ↑)
=
2
m
(M+Rβ′′)
→
√
2
m
(E2 + (E3 − E1)β′′) (By Lemma B.2;η ↓)
→
√
2 ln(1/β) ln(n+ 1)/m (By Theorem B.1;n ↑) ,
in which G is the Gumbel distribution, β′′ =
a − b ln(− ln(1 − β)), R,M which depend n, η and
a, b which are absolute constants, are all defined
in Lemma B.3 and subsequently approximated in
Lemma B.2. It remains to show that ‖A−1‖∞ =
O(η−n), which holds since η−n is the largest eigen-
value of A−1. The increase of Φj may either be justi-
fied or quantified in probability by Lemma C.1.
Practicality of the bound. The factor O(η−n)
grows exponentially with n since η < 1. Therefore,
if the bound is used in this form it may be useful for
parameter selection only for very small n. In practice,
however, the O(η−n) factor is a over-estimation and
its effective value is asymptotically sub-exponential.
We discuss this issue and propose a practical solution
in Section 6.1.
5 Lower Bounds
In this section we generalize the results of [11] to
multiple bit strings and obtain the lower bound on
approximating Φi. In the rest of this section we use
lg(x) to denote the logarithm to base 2, and we let
µ0 = 1/2− η/2 and µ1 = 1/2 + η/2.
Definition 5.1. (Strongly α-unpredictable bit
source) [11, Definition 3.2] For α ∈ [0, 1], a random
variable X = (X1, . . . , Xm) taking values in {0, 1}m
is a strongly α-unpredictable bit source if for every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have
α 6 Pr[Xi=0|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1,Xi+1=xi+1,...,Xm=xm]Pr[Xi=1|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1,Xi+1=xi+1,...,Xm=xm] 6 1/α ,
for every x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}m−1.
Definition 5.2 (β-closeness). Two random vari-
ables X and Y are β-close if the statistical dis-
tance between their distributions is at most β:∑
v 2
−1 |Pr[X = v]− Pr[Y = v]| 6 β, where the sum
is over the set supp(X) ∪ supp(Y ).
Definition 5.3 (Min-entropy). Min-entropy of a ran-
dom variable X is H∞(X) = inf
x∈Supp(X)
lg
(
1
Pr[X=x]
)
.
Proposition 5.4. (Min-entropy of strongly α-
unpredictable bit sources) If X is a strongly
α-unpredictable bit source, then X has min-entropy at
least m lg(1 + α).
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Proof. Let
p = Pr[Xi = 1 | X1 = x1, . . . , Xi−1 = xi−1, Xi+1 = xi+1, . . . , Xm = xm]
for any x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}m−1. Then
we know that α 6 (1 − p)/p 6 1/α, and thus p 6
1/(1 + α). We can then verify that no string in the
support of X has probability greater than 1/(1 +α)m.
Thus X has min-entropy at least βm, in which β =
lg(1 + α) > α.
Lemma 5.5. (A uniformly random bit string condi-
tioned on its sanitized version is an unpredictable bit
source) LetX be a uniform random variable on bit strings
of length m, and let X ′ be a perturbed version of X , such
that X ′i = Bernoulli(µ0) if Xi = 0 and Bernoulli(µ1)
otherwise. Then X conditioned on X ′ is a strongly 1−η1+η -
unpredictable bit source.
Proof. Observe that since X is a uniformly random
bit string then Xi and Xj are independent random
variables for i 6= j. Since X ′i depends only on Xi
for all i and not on any other Xj for j 6= i, then
X ′i and X
′
j are also independent random variables.
Then using Bayes theorem and uniformity of X
we can verify that for all x′ ∈ {0, 1}m and for all
x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}m−1
α 6 Pr[Xi=0|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1,Xi+1=xi+1,...,Xm=xm,X
′=x′]
Pr[Xi=1|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1,Xi+1=xi+1,...,Xm=xm,X′=x′] 6 1/α ,
in which α = µ0/µ1 = (1− η)/(1 + η).
Lemma 5.6. Let S1, . . . , Sn be n uniform random vari-
ables on bit strings of lengthm, and for all 1 6 i 6 n let S′i
be a perturbed version of Si, such that for all 1 6 j 6 m,
S′ij = Bernoulli(µ0) if Sij = 0 and Bernoulli(µ1) oth-
erwise. Let Y be a vector such that Yj =
∏
i Sij and Y
′
be a vector such that Y ′j =
∏
i S
′
ij . Then Y conditioned
on Y ′ is a strongly
(
1−η
1+η
)n
-unpredictable bit source, and
therefore has at least m lg
(
1 +
(
1−η
1+η
)n)
> m
(
1−η
1+η
)n
min-entropy.
Proof. Follows the same line of the proof of
Lemma 5.5.
Theorem 5.7. [11, Theorem 3.4] There is a universal
constant c such that the following holds. Let X be an
α-unpredictable bit source on {0, 1}m, let Y be a source
on {0, 1}m with min-entropy γm (independent from X),
and let Z = X · Y mod k for some k ∈ N, be the inner
product of X and Y mod k. Then for every β ∈ [0, 1],
the random variable (Y, Z) is β-close to (Y, U) where U
is uniform on Zk and independent of Y , provided that
m > c · k
2
αγ · lg
(
k
γ
)
· lg
(
k
β
)
.
Theorem 5.8. [11, Theorem 3.9] Let P (x, y) be a ran-
domized protocol which takes as input two uniformly
random bit vectors x, y of length m and outputs a real
number. Let P be ln( 1+η1−η )-differentially private and let
β > 0. Then with probability at least 1−β over the inputs
x, y ← {0, 1}m and the coin tosses of P , the output differs
from xT y by at least Ω
( √
m
lg(m) · β ·
1−η
1+η
)
.
Theorem 5.9. Let P (S1, . . . , Sn) =
∑
j
∏
i Sij be the
n-wise inner product of the vectors S1, . . . , Sn. If for all i,
Si is a uniform random variable on {0, 1}m, and S′i is the
perturbed version of Si, such that S′ij = Bernoulli(µ0)
if Sij = 0 and Bernoulli(µ1) otherwise, then with prob-
ability at least 1− β the output of any algorithm taking
S′1, . . . , S
′
n as inputs will differ from P (S1, . . . , Sn) by at
least Ω
( √
m
lg(m) · β ·
1−η
1+η
)
.
Proof. Without loss of generality take S1 to be one
vector and Y with Yj =
∏n
i=2 Sij to be the other vec-
tor. Then we will use Theorem 5.8 to bound ST1 Y .
To use Theorem 5.8, we first highlight that S′i is a
ln( 1+η1−η )-differentially private version of Si. Then
since Theorem 5.8 depends on Theorem 5.7, we will
show that S1 and Y satisfies the condition of the
latter theorem. Theorem 5.7 concerns inner prod-
uct between two bit sources, one is an unpredictable
bit source while the other has linear min-entropy.
Lemma 5.5 shows that S1 conditioned on its sani-
tized version S′1 is an α-unpredictable bit source and
Lemma 5.6 shows that Y has linear min-entropy (as-
suming n is constant in m).
Theorem 5.10. Let S1, . . . , Sn be uniformly random bi-
nary strings of length m and let S′i be a perturbed ver-
sion of Si, such that S′ij = Bernoulli(µ0) if Sij = 0
and Bernoulli(µ1) otherwise. Then let the vectors v, v′
of length m be such that vi =
∑
j Sji and v
′
i =
∑
j S
′
ji,
and the vector Φ = (Φ0, . . . ,Φn) in which Φi = |{j :
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vj = i}| is the frequency of i in v, and similarly for Φ′ the
frequency in v′. Then with probability at least 1− β the
output of an algorithm taking S′ differs from Φi for all i
by at least Ω
( √
m
lg(m) · β ·
1−η
1+η
)
.
Proof. We will proceed by reducing n-wise inner
product to frequency estimation. Since Theorem 5.9
forbids the former, then the theorem follows. The
reduction is as follows. Let P (j, A) =
∏
i∈A Sij
be the product of the bits in a particular position
j across a subset A of the binary strings. Observe
that
∑
j P (j, [n]), with [n] = {1, . . . , n}, is the n-
wise inner product of all the binary string. Sim-
ilarly, let P (j, A) =
∏
i∈A(1 − Sij), be the prod-
uct of the negated bits. Finally, denote Q(A) =∑
j P (j, A)P (j, A
C), in which AC = [n] \ A is the
complement of the set A. Now we claim that Φk =∑
A⊆[n],|A|=kQ(A), in which the sum is over all sub-
sets of [n] of size k. This can be seen since for a setA of
size k, P (j, A)P (j, AC) is one only if ai =
∑
i Sij = k.
Since there may be several sets A of the same size k,
we can therefore conclude that the sum over all such
sets
∑
A⊆[n],|A|=k P (j, A)P (j, A
C) is one if and only if
ai =
∑
i Sij = k, and thus the sum (over all j) of the
former quantity is the count (frequency) of the latter.
We will then show why the result follows first for
Φ0 and Φn then for Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,Φn−1. According to
this reduction, Φ0 (resp. Φn) is equivalent to the n-
wise inner product of {1 − S1, 1 − S2, . . . , 1 − Sn}
(resp. {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}) and thus if one was able to
compute Φ0 (resp. Φn) within error γ they would
have also been able to compute those two n-wise in-
ner products within error γ. Then we employ the
lower bound on the n-wise inner product from Theo-
rem 5.9 to lower bound γ for Φ0 and Φn. For Φi for
i 6∈ {0, n}, Φi is equivalent to the sum of
(
n
i
)
n-wise
inner products. In the case all but one of those n-wise
inner products are zero, an estimate of Φi within error
γ gives an estimate for a particular n-wise inner prod-
uct within error γ as well, in which we can invoke
Theorem 5.9 again to lower bound γ for Φi.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We use the Sapienza dataset [4] to evaluate our
method. It is a real-life dataset composed of wire-
less probe requests sent by mobile devices in various
locations and settings in Rome, Italy. We only use
the MAC address part of the dataset, as typical phys-
ical analytics systems do [14]. It covers a university
campus and as city-wide national and international
events. The data was collected for three months be-
tween February and May 2013, and contains around
11 million probes sent by 162305 different devices
(different MAC addresses), therefore this is the size
(m) of our indicator vectors. The released data is
anonymized. The dataset contains 8 setting called
POLITICS1, POLITICS2, VATICAN1, VATICAN2, UNI-
VERSITY, TRAINSTATION, THEMALL, and OTHERS.
Each setting is composed of several files. Files are la-
beled according to the day of capture and files within
the same setting occurring in the same day are num-
bered sequentially. In our experiments we set the
parameter n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 21}, indicating the number
of sets we want to experiment on. Then we pick n
random files from all settings and proceed to esti-
mate their t-incidence according to our algorithm.
We add 1 to all incidence counts to reduce the com-
putational overhead necessary to find a combination
of files with non-zero incidence for all t for large n, so
that the t-incidence for this random subset is nonzero
for all t. This is unlikely to affect the results since
the additive error will be much larger than 1 (about
O(
√
m)) anyway.
The additive error reported is the maximum addi-
tive error across all t. In real-life datasets, the additive
error would be a problem only for low values of t
(closer to the “intersection”), since the true value may
be smaller than the additive error. However, for high
t (closer to the “union”), high additive error is un-
likely to be damaging to utility. This is a property
of most real-world datasets since they are likely to
follow a Zipf distribution. If this is the case it may be
useful to consider employing the estimated union (or
high t) to compute the intersection (or low t) via the
inclusion-exclusion principle instead.
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6.1 Calibrating to the Dataset
In our experiments we observe that the value of
‖A−1‖∞ may be too high for small ε, making it use-
less as an upper bound in this case. This is due
to the definition of the induced norm, which takes
the maximum over all vectors whose max norm is 1.
This maximum is achieved for vectors in {−1, 1}n+1.
However, in reality it is unlikely that the error vec-
tor will be this large and thus it may never actually
reach this upper bound (as confirmed by the exper-
iments). Instead, we consider the maximum over
Γ = {−γ, γ}n+1 for γ < 1 and use the fact that lin-
earity implies maxx∈Γ ‖A−1x‖∞/‖x‖∞ = γ‖A−1‖∞.
We empirically estimate γ by estimating, from the
dataset, the multinomial distribution of Φ for each
n and each ε, then we sample vectors from this dis-
tribution and run our algorithm on them, and then
compute γ from the the resulting error vector. We
stress that this calibration process thus does not use
any aspects of the dataset other than the distribution
of Φ and that γ depends only on n and ε and not on
the actual incidence vector. Therefore, in real-life sit-
uation where there is no dataset prior to deployment
to run this calibration on, it suffices to have prior
knowledge (or expectation) to the distribution of the
incidence vectors. For most applications it should
follow a power-law distribution.
If Figure 2, all the lines represent the 1−β quantile.
For instance, in the Sapienza line, the 1− β quantile
(over 1000 runs) is shown. For the other line, the
upper bound value was computed to hold with prob-
ability at least 1−β. The value of β we used is 0.1. The
corresponding values for the lower bound are inde-
pendent from n and are {1.3× 10−5, 8.7× 10−6, 5.3×
10−6, 3.2 × 10−6, 1.9 × 10−6, 1.2 × 10−6, 7.1 × 10−7},
respective to the x-axis. We observe that the upper
bound is validated by the experiments as it is very
close to the observed additive error. In addition, the
additive error itself resulting from our algorithm is
very small even for ε as small as 0.5. For ε = 0.1 the
additive error increase is unavoidable since such rela-
tively high error may be necessary to protect the high
privacy standard in this case.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a novel algorithm for estimating
incidence counts of sanitized indicator vectors. It can
also be used to estimate the n-wise inner product of
sanitized bit vectors as the relationship is described
in the proof of Theorem 5.10. We provided a theo-
retical upper bound that is validated by experiments
on real-life datasets to be very accurate. Moreover,
we extended a previous lower bound on 2-wise in-
ner product to n-wise inner product. Finally, we
evaluated our algorithm on a real-world dataset and
validated the accuracy, the general upper bound and
the lower bound.
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A The Probability Mass Function
(PMF) of Z(j)
Since Z(j) = Binomial(j, 1 − p) + Binomial(n −
j, p) then its PMF is equivalent to the convo-
lution: Pr[Z(j) = i] =
∑
` Pr[Binomial(j, 1 −
p) = `] Pr[Binomial(n − j, p) = i − `]. Con-
sider one term in the summation, t`, which equals[
(1− p)`pj−`
(
j
`
)] [
pi−`(1− p)−i−j+n+`
(
n−j
i−`
)]
. Since
the ratio t`+1t` =
(`−i)(`−j)
(`−i−j+n+1)(`+1)
(
p−1
p
)2
is a rational
function in ` then the summation over ` can be rep-
resented as a hypergeometric function: Pr[Z(j) =
i] = t0 · 2F1
( −i; −j
−i−j+n+1
∣∣ (p−1
p
)2)
, in which t0 =
(1 − p)n−i−jpi+j
(
n−j
i
)
, given that i + j 6 n. The
case of i+ j > n is computed by symmetry as in (5).
The notation 2F1 denotes the Gauss hypergeomet-
ric function 2F1
(
a; b
c
∣∣ z) = ∑k>0 akbkck zkk! , in which
xk = x(x + 1) · · · (x + k − 1) is the rising factorial
notation, also known as the Pochhammer symbol
(x)k.
B Bounding Deviation of A′′ from
its Mean
Theorem B.1 (Bounding deviation of A′′). Let α =
f(δ)/2 and β be positive real numbers less than
one. Then with probability at least 1 − β, if m =
Ω
(
− ln(β) ln(n)α−2
)
, then
∥∥AΦ̂−A′′Φ̂∥∥∞ 6 α.
Proof. Using Lemma B.2 and the fact that E(n, x)
approaches
√
Z − ln(πZ − π ln(π))/
√
2, as n ap-
proaches∞ (according to its expansion at n → ∞),
in which Z(x) = ln(2n2/ ln2(4/x)). This is a good
approximation even for n > 1 except for x = 1
it becomes a good approximation for n > 4. Let
Ex = E(n, x) and C = C(x), then using Lemma B.2,
m = Ω(α−2{E2 + C[E3 − E1]}2) = Ω(α−2{E22 +
C2[E3 − E1]2}) = Ω(α−2{E22 + C2[E23 − E21 ]}) =
Ω(α−2C2E23) = Ω(α
−2 ln(1/β) ln(n)).
Lemma B.2. Let α, β < 1 be positive real numbers. Then
with probability at least 1− β, if 2m >
(
α−1D(n, β)
)2,
then
∥∥AΦ̂ − A′′Φ̂∥∥∞ 6 α, in which D(n, β) =
E(n, 2) + C(1 − β) (E(n, 3)− E(n, 1)), E(n, x) =
erf−1((4/x)−1/(n+1)), C(x) = c0 ln log2(1/x), and
c0 = 1/ ln log4(4/3).
Proof. Using Lemma B.3. Since A goes to a rank-
1 matrix as fast as ηn (its smallest eigenvalue), we
see that for every i, Aij(1−Aij) approaches a value
that does not depend on j, call it pi. Therefore,∑
j 2ΦjAij(1 − Aij) approaches 2pi
∑
j Φj = 2pim,
a value which does not depend on the particular,
unknown, composition. Since thus the choice of
the weak (n + 1)-composition Φ of m does not
matter, we set Φj = m/(n + 1) in the statement
of Lemma B.3 and proceed3. Therefore F (x) ap-
proaches Fη↓(x)
def
=
∏
i erf
(
x/
√
2mpi
)
. We could
compute the limit pi if we require dependence on
η for fine tuning. However, we will instead use the
3If η is not small enough, then the probability matrix A ap-
proaches the identity matrix I and Ψ, a known quantity, becomes
close to the unknown quantity Φ. Hence, we can substitute it
instead. For practical purposes, if this is the case, then we we
would not need this lemma and could using Lemma B.3 directly.
In special cases where Φ is close to uniform, we may quantify the
probability of setting Φj = m/(n+ 1) by Lemma C.1.
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bound pi = Aij(1 − Aij) 6 1/4 (for any j, since in
the limit Aij(1 − Aij) = Aik(1 − Aik) for all j, k).
The bound holds since Aij is a probability value in
(0, 1) and the maximum of the polynomial x(1 − x)
is 1/4. Consequently, Fη↓(x) > erf
(
x
√
2/m
)n+1
.
Therefore F−1η↓ (q) = (
√
m/2) erf−1(q1/(n+1)). Hence,
M+RC(1− β) = (
√
m/2)D(n, β).
Lemma B.3. Let F (x) =∏
i erf
(
x/
√∑
j 2ΦjAij(1−Aij)
)
be a cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) and letM = F−1(1/2)
and R = F−1(3/4) − F−1(1/4) be the median and the
interquantile range of the distribution represented by F ,
respectively. Additionally, let C(x) = c0 ln log2(1/x), in
which c0 = 1/ ln log4(4/3). Then, if α < 1 is a positive
real number, then with probability at least 1− β we have
that
∥∥AΦ̂−A′′Φ̂∥∥∞ 6 m−1(M+RC(1− β)).
Proof. Consider the following transformation of the
random variable A′′:
m
∥∥AΦ̂−A′′Φ̂∥∥∞ = m∥∥(A−A′′)(Φ/m)∥∥∞
= m
∥∥(A−A′diag(1/Φ))(Φ/m)∥∥∞
= m
∥∥(Adiag(Φ)−A′)diag(1/Φ)(Φ/m)∥∥∞
= m
∥∥(Adiag(Φ)−A′)1/m∥∥∞
=
∥∥(Adiag(Φ)−A′)1∥∥∞
=
∥∥AΦ−A′1∥∥∞ = maxi {|Ai•Φ−A′i•|}
= max
i
{∣∣∣∣∑
j
AijΦj −A′ij
∣∣∣∣}
. max
i
{∣∣∣∣∑
j
AijΦj − Binomial(Φj , Aij)
∣∣∣∣} ,
since the marginal distribution of a multinomial ran-
dom variable is the binomial distribution, which in
turn converges in distribution to the normal distribu-
tion, by the centrali limit theorem, as minj Φj grows
(which is justified in Lemma C.1),
d→ max
i
{∣∣∣∣∑
j
AijΦj −N (ΦjAij , σ2ij = ΦjAij(1−Aij))
∣∣∣∣}
= max
i
{∣∣∣∣∑
j
N (0, σ2ij)
∣∣∣∣} = maxi
{∣∣∣∣N (0,∑
j
σ2ij)
∣∣∣∣}
= max
i
{
HalfNormal
(
θ2i =
π
2
∑
j σ
2
ij
)}
,
which, as n grows, converges in distribution to
the Gumbel distribution, by the extreme value the-
orem [5]: d→ G(aR + M, bR), in which R =
F−1(3/4) − F−1(1/4), M = F−1(1/2), a =
− ln(ln 2)/ ln(log4(4/3)), and b = −1/ ln(log4(4/3)),
where F (x) =
∏
i Fi(x) and Fi(x) is the CDF of
HalfNormal
(
θ2i
)
. Therefore, computing the quan-
tile function of the Gumbel distribution at 1 − β
shows that with probability at least 1 − β we have
m
∥∥AΦ̂−A′′Φ̂∥∥∞ 6M+R(a− b ln(− ln(1− β))) =
M+R
[
ln(− log2(1−β))
ln(log4(4/3))
]
. The last convergence result
is due the fact that maximums approach Gumbel and
therefore we choose a Gumbel distribution matching
the median and interquantile range of the actual dis-
tribution of the maximum of HalfNormals, whose
CDF is the multiplication of their CDFs. This is done
by setting a and b to be the parameters of a Gumbel
distribution G(a, b) with zero median and interquan-
tile range of one, and then using the fact that Gumbel
distribution belong to a location-scale family, which
also implies that the Gumbel distribution is uniquely
defined by its median and interquantile range (two
unknowns and two equations).
C Discrete Uniform Distribution
on Φ
We treat the case of uniform streams in this section.
We call the vector a = (a1, . . . , am) uniform if ai is
uniform on the range {0, . . . , n}. Considering the
marginal distribution of the resulting incidence vector,
we observe that in this case EΦi = EΦj for all i, j.
However, Φi will be strongly concentrated around
13
its mean. Therefore, we consider an even stronger
model in which EΦi is still equal to EΦj for all i, j,
but Φi is marginally almost uniform on its range. An
algorithm doing well in this latter case (with higher
variance) can intuitively do at least as well in the
former case (with less variance).
The vector Φ is a vector of n + 1 elements but
only n degrees of freedom; since it has to sum to m.
Therefore, we cannot consider the discrete uniform
product distribution on its entries. Instead, we will
consider the joint uniform distribution on all non-
negative integer vectors which sum to m. All such
vectors are the set of weak (n + 1)-compositions of
m [15, p. 25].
Lemma C.1. If m > (n+1)δ
1− n
√
1−β , then with probability
at least 1 − β, minj Φj > δ, assuming Φ are picked
uniformly at random from all weak (n+ 1)-compositions
of m.
Proof. Notice that the sum of Φ must be m, therefore,
it has only n degrees of freedom instead of n + 1.
In fact, Φ is the multivariate uniform distribution
on weak (n + 1)-compositions4 of m. Notice that
the marginal distribution of Φj is not Uniform(0,m),
but rather lower values of Φj have strictly higher
probability than greater ones.
Consider the compositions of m into exactly n+ 1
parts, in which each part is greater than or equals
δ. There is exactly5 Cn+1(m; δ)
def
= Cn+1(m − (n +
1)δ) such compositions. Hence, the joint probability
that all entries of Φ exceed a desired threshold δ,
simultaneously, is Cn+1(m;δ)Cn+1(m) .
In the rest of this proof we will use
[
n
k
]
, the un-
signed Stirling cycle number (i.e. Stirling numbers of
the first kind), xn = x(x−1) · · · (x−(n−1)) the falling
factorial power, and xn = x(x+1) · · · (x+(n−1)) the
rising factorial power. We will also use the identity
xn =
∑
k
[
n
k
]
xk. All the definitions and a proof of
the aforementioned identity could be found in [10,
4A weak k-composition of an integer n is a way of writing n as
the sum of k non-negative integers (zero is allowed) [15, p. 25]. It
is similar to integer partitions except that the order is significant.
The number of such weak compositions is Ck(n) =
(n+k−1
k−1
)
.
5There are n+ 1 urns, each already have at least δ balls. Thus
m− (n+ 1)δ balls remain to distribute into n+ 1 urns.
p. 264].
Cn+1(m; δ)
Cn+1(m)
=
(
m+n−(n+1)δ
n
)(
m+n
n
) = (m+ n− (n+ 1)δ)n
(m+ n)n
=
∏n−1
i=0 (m+ n− (n+ 1)δ − i)∏n−1
i=0 (m+ n− i)
=
∏n
i=1(m+ n− (n+ 1)δ − (n− i))∏n
i=1(m+ n− (n− i))
=
(m+ 1− (n+ 1)δ)n
(m+ 1)n
,
and then, substituting µ = m + 1 and ν = n + 1 for
readability
Cn+1(m; δ)
Cn+1(m)
=
(µ− νδ)ν−1
µν−1
> 1− β
⇐⇒ (µ− νδ)ν−1 > (1− β)µν−1
⇐⇒
∑
k
[
ν − 1
k
]
(µ− νδ)k >
∑
k
[
ν − 1
k
]
(1− β)µk
⇐⇒
∑
k
[
ν − 1
k
]
((µ− νδ)k − (1− β)µk) > 0 ,
which is true when the sufficient condition (µ−νδ)k−
(1 − β)µk > 0 holds for all 1 6 k 6 n. Equivalently,
when
(µ− νδ)k > (1− β)µk ⇐⇒
(
µ− νδ
µ
)k
> (1− β)
⇐⇒ k ln(µ− νδ
µ
) > ln(1− β)
⇐⇒ µ− νδ
µ
> exp(ln(1− β)/k)
⇐⇒ µ− νδ
µ
> k
√
1− β ⇐⇒ 1− νδ
µ
> k
√
1− β
⇐⇒ νδ
µ
6 1− k
√
1− β ⇐= m > (n+ 1)δ
1− n
√
1− β
− 1 .
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